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RESTATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is about two issues of law, it is about two issues of law, it is about two issues of 
law. Defendants would like to recharacterize it as issues of fact because the Commission's Decision 
on the law runs contrary those of state supreme courts throughout the country. Respondents have 
cited no law or cases to support the Commission's decisions on the law. Respondents have not 
attempted to distinguish the authorities cited by Claimant in his opening appellate brief. 
The law is that: A Surety that erroneously notifies a claimant that he has no coverage is 
estopped to raise the one-year statute of limitation defense. The law also is that: Once an employer 
provides worker's compensation benefits in the fonn ofmedical treatment, a claimant has five years 
from the termination of benefits to file his claim. Despite Respondents' strenuous efforts to 
recharacterize this as a challenge of the Referee's factual decisions, this case is about two issues of 
law. 
A. The surety's letter to Quinton Bunn declaring that he did not have worker's 
compensation coverage is misleading as a matter of law. 
In Quinton's opening brief, Claimant cites four similar cases where a surety had erroneously 
notified a claimant that he or she had no coverage: Although it is only four, it is also a unanimous 
representation of every jurisdiction that has addressed the issue. In each case, it made no difference 
what reason the surety used for denying coverage. Thus, when the surety denied coverage because 
the claimant was president of the employer, Robertson v. Brissey's Garage, Inc., 270 S.C. 58, 
240 S.E.2d 810 (1978), or because the claimant is an independent contractor, McKaskte v. 
Industrial Com'n of Arizona 135 Ariz. 168, 659 P.2d 1313 (Ariz.App.,1982), or because the 
claimant is a part time worker, Bauer v. State ex  rel. Wyoming Worker's Compensation Div. 
695 P.2d 1048 (Wyo.,1985), or when the surety claims, similar to what Liberty Northwest did with 
Quinton, that the injury is a result of a non-industrial disease and not an industrial injury. Levo v. 
General-Shea-Morrison, 128 Mont. 570,280 P.2d 1086 (1955) -whenever the surety erroneously 
tells the Claimant he or she has no coverage, that error is, as amatter of law, an estoppel to raise the 
defense of the one year bar to file a claim. 
Respondent mischaracterizes the, legal finding of the Referee as a factual finding. The 
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finding at issue is: 
Nothing in Employer's actions reasonably served to mislead Claimant about 
eligibility for workers' compensation benefits. The belief or expectations about 
vavlnent held bv claimant's treaters do not establish that claimant was misled. 
. . 
Neither claimant's nor any physician's hopes or expectations of payment can alter the 
Idaho Workers' Compensation Law. Below are three reasons why. 
FOFICOL: P I 5  
Respondents fail to read that statement in context. When read in context, it is clear the 
statement is a legal finding, not a factual finding. In the first place, it is not the employer's actions 
that Quinton challenges as misleading, but rather the denial letter received from the Surety. The 
factual findings do not address whether Quinton was mislead by the denial letter of the Surety. 
Secondly, Referee Donohue proceeds to explain his reasons for his conclusion of law as follows: 
"First, Claimant received a denial letter, his subsequent request for review does not legally require 
further response from defendants." FOFIC0L:PlG Referee Donohue's conclusions is directly 
opposite to the decisions in Robertson, supra; McKaskle, supra; Bauer, supra; Levo, supra. 
All four of these opinions say that if a surety misinforms a claimant as to coverage, the surety & 
resuonsible for the misinforming a claimant; the surety does bear the risk of the misinformation; 
a surety must further resuond when it becomes enlightened that its denial may have been based on 
misinformation or the surety is estopped to raise the one year statute of limitations. The nature of 
Defendants' duty, or lack thereof, is a legal issue, not a factual. 
Referee Donohue gives two more reasons. The next reason given is that "Nothing about 
employer's alleged action in assisting Claimant to seek the first physician has created the liability 
for Defendants." FOFICOL:P17 This is merely basing the Referee's first conclusion of law on his 
second one that treatment is not payment. It will be addressed in t'he next section. But, as will be 
shown, that is a legal conclusion. 
RefereeDonohue7s final given reason is, "Employers' actions which occurred before surety's 
denial letter do not negate the clear expression that the denial of liability expressed therein." 
FOFIC0L:PlE 
Once again, no one is saying it was an action on behalf of the employer that mislead Quinton 
Bunn. It is the denial letter itself and the "clear expression of the denial of liability expressed 
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therein." All these expressions by Referee Donohue to explain his conclusion that, "Nothing in 
employer's action reasonably serve to mislead Claimant about eligibility for workers compensation 
benefits," shows that he was making a legal conclusion, not a factual finding. 
The surety's letter is misleading on its face. It is erroneous, and it is misleading. That is 
beyond dispute. The question is whether it is legally misleading for purposes of Idaho Code 4 72- 
706(1). And that decision is a legal one. The Referee does not say Quinton Bum was not misled 
because he - factually - didn't believe the letter. The Referee does not say that Quinton was not 
misled because he - factually - had superior knowledge of the law. The Referee does not say 
Quinton was not misled because - as a factual matter - the letter was correct when it told Quinton 
he was not entitled to coverage. It says he was not misled because the denial letter was legally 
sufficient on its face and the surety had no further responsibility, even after the surety knew better. 
That is not a factual conclusion, it is a legal conclusion. But it is not the law. 
The Idaho Worker's Cornpensation Law should follow the law as established in other 
jurisdictions, that when the surety erroneously info& a~laimant that he has no coverage, the surety 
cannot then raise the one year Statute of Limitations defense if the Claiinant fails to file a timely 
claim. 
B. When an employer provides medical treatment for an injured Claimant, such 
treatment is "compensation" for purposes of the five year Statute of Limitations. 
The Claimant's next appeal is with Referee Donohue's conclusion, again, clearly a legal 
conclusion -- that: "Claimant's ultimate argument - that treatment somehow constitutes 
compensation" - is unpersuasive. The limitation is based uponpayment." FOFIC0L:PZO That 
conclusion by the Referee is clearly, and unmistakably, a legal conclusion. 
Why did the Referee make that statement? Why did he even write paragraph 20? Paragraph 
20 inherently implies the finding that Quinton got treatment, and that Heritage Safe arranged it. 
Otherwise, why else would the Referee be talking about "treatment" and "payment" if the doctor's 
appoint had nothing to do with Quinton's employment? Why did he fill his opinion with dicta? If, 
the Referee found -- as Respondents would have you believe -- that the employer did not arrange 
for the treatment , that the appointment for Quinton purely as an act of kindness, just as a favor, a 
mere courtesy, to help with Quinton's personal problem -If, the Referee found, as Respondents 
Reply Brief, 
0:\69\6943\Pleadingskppeal\Reply BrieEwpd Page 3 
would have you believe, that just because the einployer made the appointment does not mean it was 
for treatment; then the whole paragraph 20 of the Referee's findings and conclusions is sheer obiter 
dicta with no relevance to this case. If Quinton did not get treatment, and if not at the behest of his 
employer, then the Referee's discussion of whether "treatment" is "payment" for purposes of Idaho 
Code 5 72-706 is a waste of pen and paper. 
All of the Referee's justifications for his determination in paragraph 20 show that he is 
assuming the appointment was made by the employer in the employer's behalf. The Referee states, 
"An employer has the right to choose a treating physician, whenever the Idaho Worker's 
Compensation Law may apply." FOFICOkP17 Then he adds "The designation of an initial 
physician does not create any liability on the defendants' part." FOFICOL:Pl7 Finally he 
concludes, "Eventually, Claimant's argument would lead to the conclusion that every time an 
employer designated a physician to check out a potential workers compensation related injury or 
occupational disease, its surety would be autoinatically liable." FOFICOkP21 
A11 these statements presuppose that the employer made an appointment for the claimant. 
The Referee uses these statements to justify the conclusion that Quinton's argument that treatment 
equates with payment is unpersuasive. That conclusion, that treatment is not payment, is a legal 
conclusion, not a factual. 
The abundant case law cited by Claimant, none ofwhich has been discussed, distinguished, 
or compared to contradictory case law by Respondents, all reach the conclusion that treatment is 
payment. If the employer provides an injured employee with medical treatment, the five year Statute 
of Limitation of LC. 72-706(2) is triggered - whether the check from the surety ever arrived at the 
doctor's office or not. 
Respondents have not cited a single case to the contrary. Rather, they have defended this 
erroneous legal conclusion on what they wish had been the Referee's Findings of Fact. They wish 
the Referee had found that the appointment with Lakeview Clinic had been made purely for 
Quinton's personal behalf. They wish that Lakeview Clinic understood that neither Heritage nor its 
workers compensation surety was responsible for the costs. Respondent's Brief p. 7 They 
brazenly state that Lakeview Clinic knew the costs of the visit would be borne by Mr. Bunn. 
Respondents go so far as to state, that such are the facts. They wish that the identity of Heritage Safe 
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as the responsible party was based solely upon representations by Mr. Bunn, and not any 
representations by Heritage or its surety. Respondents' Brief:P8 Such statements are a far stretch 
of the facts. 
Referee Donohue's decision makes no'such findings. Referee Donohue's opinion glosses 
over who made the appointment, and why, but dives straight into the legal conclusions that 
presupposes the appointment was obtained by Heritage. 
Carol Beckstead was not Quinton's mother. Quinton did not ask her for medical attention 
because he needed her help to make a personal doctor appointment. Quinton was twenty-five years 
old. He could make his own phone call. It was Carol Beckstead herselfwho testified, "I tell - at the 
time I tell the doctor's office, you know, that it will be billed to Liberty Northwest at the time." 
Tr.P36:9-11 The exhibits from the mkdical office clearly show the intake was as a workers 
compensation case. It was Heritage Safe's own personnel who filled out Exhibit 1 and Exhibit 3, 
confirming that Heritage Safe provided the treatment to Quinton for an industrial related incident. 
The testimony of Lisa Harvey clearly states, "If someone were to call from Heritage Safe - and I am 
not even saying specifically Carol - and asked if we could see and employee, then it would be my 
understanding that Heritage Safe would cover the employee's visit if it were workman's comp." 
Harvey Depo 44: 15 -20 It was also Lisa Harvey's testimony that said, "Since we received back from 
this workman's comp, or a letter like this, then they were obiiously were aware of it." Harvey Dep 
35:2-4 
Quinton didn't ask Carol Beckstead to make the appointment. He talked to Shannon 
Johnson. Tr. 22:7-12 Shannon Johnson notified Carol Beckstead, who handled Heritage Safe's 
worker's compensation matters. Tr. 22:21-22 Carol Beckstead asked Quinton; "Do you really 
think you need to have this checked?" Tr. 22:24-1 What did she care if all she was doing was a 
personal favor? Why would she ask unless she had concern about the payment implications? She 
is not Quinton's mother. What does she care whether of not Quinton wanted to see a doctor for his 
own personal needs? 
When Claimant filed his Motion to Reconsider with the Commission, he supported it laden 
with case law from many surrounding jurisdictions, all of which conclude that the requirement of 
"payment" for the sake of statutes like 72-706(2) does not require a cashed check. "Payment" is, in 
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a legal sense, when the arrangements for medical treatment are made. With the motion to reconsider 
before them; with a11 long list of case law before them, the Referee and the Commission had an easy 
out. All they had to do was find that Quinton's appointment with the Lakeview Clinic was purely 
a personal favor by Carol for Quinton's personal problem. The Commission had an open invitation 
to add a finding that the call from Carol Beckstead, "who always tells the receptionist at Lakeview 
whether it is worker's compensation related or not," was purely a'favor, and that Lakeview had a 
clear understanding that Quinton was footing the bill. With that open invitation plainly before it, the 
Commission declined to make such a finding that it knew was untrue, and instead the Commission 
chose to adopt Donohue's legal finding that: "Claimant's alternative argument - that treatment 
somehow constitutes compensation - is unpersuasive. 
SUMMARY 
The Commission's factual determinations are not the dispute here. It is the Commission's 
two legal conclusions: that an erroneous letter from the surety denying coverage is, as a matter of 
law, not misleading; and the Commission's legal conclusions that, "treatment" is not "payment" for 
purposes of LC. 72-706(2), that are at issue. Respondents' recitation of selected facts does not 
change that the Referee's opinion is wrong in both of these two critical legal conclusions. 
This Court should adopt the majority view, that when a surety erroneously infonns a 
Claimant he or she has no coverage; and when an employer provides treatment to an employee, both 
or either event affect the stringent strictures of Idaho Code 5 72-706. An injured claimant has the 
statutorily granted right to file his legitimate claim after one year if he is either misled or afforded 
benefits. After all, this Court at least still pays lip service to the notion that worker's compensation 
law exists for the protection of Idaho's employees. 
Accordingly, the Commission's opinion ought to be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted this m d a y  of June, 2009. 
MERRILL & MERRILL, CHARTERED 
By: 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, one of the attorneys for the Claimant, in the above-referenced matter, do hereby certify that 
a true, full and correct copy of the foregoing document was this &day of June, 2009, served 
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E. Scott Hannon [ < U.S. Mail 
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